Abstract-All the proposed Hill cipher modifications have been restricted to the use of dynamic keys only. In this paper, we propose an extension of Hill cipher modification based on eigenvalues HCM-EE, called HCM-EXDKS. The proposed extension generating dynamic encryption key matrix by exponentiation that is made efficiently with the help of eigenvalues, HCM-EXDKS introduces a new class of dynamic keys together with dynamically changing key size. Security of HCM-EXDKS is provided by the use of a large number of dynamic keys with variable size. The proposed extension is more effective in the encryption quality of RGB images than HCM-EE and Hill cipher-known modifications in the case of images with large single colour areas and slightly more effective otherwise. HCM-EXDKS almost has the same encryption time as HCM-EE, and HCM-HMAC. HCM-EXDKS is two times faster than HCM-H, having the best encryption quality among Hill cipher modifications compared versus HCM-EXDKS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Hill cipher (HC) is a well-known symmetric cryptosystem [1] , [2] . The core of HC is matrix manipulations; it multiplies a plaintext vector by a key matrix to get the ciphertext. The HC is extremely secure against ciphertext only and brute force attacks. That is because the key space is extremely large, due to choosing the matrix elements from a large set of integers [3] , it is also resistant to the frequency letter analysis, but it can be broken by the known plaintext-ciphertext attack (KPCA) [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . The key matrix can be calculated easily from a set of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The vulnerability of the HC to the KPCA makes it unusable in practice. Security of HC was improved in [5] , [8] , [9] , [10] . One of proposed their methods, HCM-PT, uses a dynamic key matrix obtained by permutations of rows and columns from the master key matrix to get every next ciphertext, and transfers it together with an HC-encrypted permutation to the receiving side. Thus, in HCM-PT, each plaintext vector is encrypted by a new dynamic key matrix that prevents the KPCA; the number of possible dynamic keys is equal to the number of permutations of the key matrix rows, and it may be used as a characteristic of its security. But permutations in HCM-PT are transferred HC-encrypted, which means that master key matrix can be revealed by the KPCA on the transferred encrypted permutations [10] . Modification [8] , HCM-NPT, works as HCM-PT does, but without permutations transfer; instead, both communicating parties use a pseudo-random permutation generator, and only the consecutive number of the necessary permutation is transferred to the receiver. It has good computational complexity and the number of its dynamic keys is the same as for HCM-PT, but [11] shows that HCM-NPT is not effective in the encryption quality of RGB bitmap images in the case of images with large single colour areas.
Another HC modification [9] , HILLMRIV, also uses dynamic key matrices: it modifies each row of the matrix key by multiplying the current key by a secret initial vector. But HILLMRIV is still vulnerable to KPCA [12] , [13] . Another HC modification [10] , HCM-H, also uses dynamic key matrix produced with the help of a one way hash function applied to an integer picked up randomly by the sender to get the key matrix, and a vector added to the product of the key matrix with a plain text. HCM-H is vulnerable [14] to chosen-ciphertext attack because the selected random number is transmitted in clear over the communication link and is repeated. To avoid this random number transfer, a modification of HCM-H [14] , HCM-HMAC, uses only a seed value secure transfer, and then both parties generate necessary numbers synchronously, where HMAC is a hash function, e.g., MD5 [15] , SHA-1 [16] . The difference between HCM-H and HCM-HMAC is similar to the difference between HCM-PT and HCM-NPT. Despite these improvement, the Hill cipher still either susceptible to the KPCA or ineffective in image encryption in the case of images with large single colour area.
Up to now, HC modifications consider the dynamic keys as the major solution for enhancing the security and reducing the risk of cryptanalysis of the HC. However, using the dynamic keys is not always the best solution, since the generated keys are dependent on the initial parameters. In this paper, we propose an extension of the HC modification, HCM-EE [11] . HCM-EE generates dynamic encryption key matrix efficiently with the help of eigenvalues; it uses the eigenvalues for matrix exponentiation to a pseudo-random power for a new key When HC is used, A and B share an invertible key matrix K. Sender A encrypts a plaintext vector, P:
The receiver, B, decrypts the ciphertext vector C by
where 1 K  is the key inverse. For existence of
where gcd is the greatest common divisor and det(K) denotes the determinant of K. HCM-PT [5] differs from HC in the following. To encrypt a plaintext P, A randomly selects a permutation, t, of Zm, and permutes the rows and columns of a key matrix K according to t producing a new key-matrix Kt=t(K). HCM-PT encryption is then performed by (1), but using Kt instead of K. Additionally, sender A encrypts t by (1) using K and getting u as a ciphertext, and sends C and u together to the receiver. In order to decrypt the ciphertext, B decrypts t from u by (2), gets (K-1)t = (Kt)-1 [5] from K-1, and then reveals the plaintext by (2), using (K-1)t instead of K-1. The number of dynamic keys used in HCM-PT is
HCM-NPT [8] uses the same initialization and the same encryption/decryption technique as HCM-PT does. But HCM-NPT assumes that the sender, A, and the receiver, B, share a secret seed value, SEED, which is used to generate a pseudo-random sequence of permutations. In order to encrypt a plaintext, the sender, A, selects a number r, and calculates.
getting the r-th output permutation from the pseudorandom permutation generator PRPermutationG (r can be a block number in the sequence of transmitted blocks, or its function). Sender A then gets a ciphertext C as in HCM-PT, and sends to receiver B both C and r. In order to decrypt, B calculates t r according to (5), and then gets the plaintext as in HCM-PT. The number of dynamic keys used in HCM-NPT, NDK(HCM-NPT), is the same as NDK(HCM-PT) (4). Proposed in [10] , another HC modification, HCM-H, works as follows. The sender, A, and the receiver, B, share an invertible matrix K. To encrypt the plaintext P , A, selects a random integer a, where 0 aN  , and applies a one way hash function to compute the parameter 11 12 ( || || || ... || )
, where 11 12 , ,..., mm k k k are the elements of K ; b is used to select the ij k from K, where i and j can be calculated according to (6) 
Then, A generates a vector
Then, A encrypts the plaintext P by
and sends together C and a to B. The decryption process is done by 1 1 ) (
The number of dynamic keys used in HCM-H is
Proposed in [14] , HCM-HMAC, works as follows. In 
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and sends together C t and a to B, t=1,2,... The receiver B calculates the required parameters by using (11)- (14), and then gets the plaintext by [4] , giving the number of positive integers less than N and co-prime to it. Then A constructs an invertible matrix Q and calculates the key matrix K [19] :
where D is a diagonal matrix, diagonal elements of which are its eigenvalues from E. SEEDt is used to generate a pseudo-random sequence of permutations t. In order to encrypt the i-th plaintext
then calculates
where j eE  , n is the number of blocks, and the random permutation r t can be obtained by (5) . Finally, A calculates
where i D is a diagonal matrix, diagonal elements of which are from i E (19) after exponentiation to i l and permutation r t are performed and
The plaintext P i is encrypted as follows ()
where
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, B computes l i according to (18) , t r according to (5) and (21), i E according to (19) , and
Then, B retrieves the plaintext:
It is appropriate to mention that for computing 
III. THE PROPOSED EXTENSION OF HCM-EE (HCM-EXDKS)
Here, we extend the HCM-EE (HCM-EXDKS) to be more secure and more effective in encryption quality by using dynamic keys together with the dynamic key size for encryption each plaintext block.
The proposed extension assumes the same initial settings and the same encryption-decryption as in HCM-EE. Additionally, we assume the parties share the secret values MAXks and MINksb, which are used to calculate the size for each block by using the pseudo-random numbers generated by (18) (1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,16,15,14,13 ), and t = ( 2,1,3,4,6,5 ) .
Note that by (26), the set of dynamic key sizes (DKS) DKS = {6, 16, 6}.
The first block encryption:
KeySize  , hence, the used matrices will be 66  , and 1 E will take the first 6 elements from E , Since the receiver has the matrices 1 , QQ  , the set E and the encrypted block number, the receiver can calculate the elements of l according to (18) , i E using (19) (Fig. 1) , Symbol.bmp (Fig. 2) , and Blackbox.bmp (Fig. 3) . Also we examined the encryption quality for an image that does not contain many high frequency components: Lena.bmp (Fig. 4) . The Girl.bmp (Fig. 5) is used as an example of an image containing many high frequency components. Each image is encrypted using HCM-PT, HCM-H, HCM-HMAC, HCM-EE, and HCM-EXDKS. The quality of encryption of these images is studied by visual inspection (Figs. 1-5 ) and quantitavely (Table I, used irregular deviation based quality measure ID [9, 20, 21] is explained in the Appendix).
Based on visual inspection, it is obvious that HCM-EXDKS and HCM-EE are better than HCM-PT, HCM-H, and HCM-HMAC in hiding all the features of the image containing large single colour areas (Figs. 1-3) .
Based on the numerical evaluation of encryption quality measure ID (Table I , the smaller ID, the better), we note that the proposed extension HCM-EXDKS versus HCM-EE gives better encryption quality. Table I shows also that the proposed extension HCM-EXDKS is more effective in encryption quality than HCM-PT, HCM-H, HCM-HMAC, and HCM-EE. On the other hand, HCM-PT, HCM-H, HCM-HMAC, HCM-EE, and HCM-EXDKS are all good in encrypting images containing many high frequency components (Lena.bmp and Girl.bmp); all the algorithms give nearly the same results.
We examined the encryption time for the Nike.bmp image having 124 124 x pixels and 45KB size. The encryption time measured when applying HCM-PT, HCM-H, HCM-HMAC, HCM-EE, and HCM-EXDKS is shown in Table II . In our implementation, HCM-EE and HCM-EXDKS were used with RC4 [4] for the pseudorandom permutation generator (5) , and pseudo-random number generator (18) . We implemented HCM-H with SHA-1 [16] since the latter has been used in [10] 
B. HCM-EXDKS Versus AES
To give adequate performance comparison, we examine our proposed extension HCM-EXDKS versus other well known algorithms (e.g. AES). We examined the encryption quality of several images. Based on visual inspection, the proposed HCM-EXDKS encrypts the images with large single colour areas (identical plaintext blocks), it successfully hides data patterns. The AES fails to hide the data patterns for the images contain large single colour areas (Mecy.bmp: Fig. 6 , Penguin.bmp: Fig.  7 , and bicycle.bmp: Fig. 8 ). That is, the proposed HCM-EXDKS has advantage in encryption of identical plaintext blocks over the AES. 
